Last week, the two co-existing histories of Canada’s system of copyright, however contradictory, were on full display. A twitter discussion that began with moral rights, culminated with Carys Craig, Heather Martin, Bob Tarantino, and I, emphasizing how challenging it is to engage in creative endeavor which incorporates a prior work (even in the realm of parody). Bryan Frye was duly sympathetic:
But then on Friday, under the aegis of the Program in Information Justice and Intellectual Property, a Canada-U.S. panel discussed at length how an Open Educational Resource (OER) created in one country, could be relied on as legitimate in the other country. (Said another way, OERs, like essential goods and services, can cross the Canada/U.S. border.) Carys, Lucie Guibault, and Ariel Katz deftly illustrated the strength of fair dealing in the realms of research, private study, and education. This despite the recent FCA decision relating to York University’s application of fair dealing in 2011.
One aspect that went unremarked was that Canadian development of fair dealing differs from that of American fair use. While both rely on a fairness analysis, Canada has managed to avoid some challenges experienced by the United States. Two critical aspects have been held at bay:
1. An undue regard for licensing.
“The availability of a license is not relevant to deciding whether a dealing has been fair (CCH v. LSUC, 2004, para. 70).” Sixteen years may have left Canadians complacent with those words crafted by former Chief Justice Beverley Mclachlin, words which were supported with unanimity by the Supreme Court. That said, complacency should not eliminate appreciation for our Court’s foresight.
No explanation, no citation, was ever given for that piece of wisdom. But it is hard to believe that McLachlin and her clerks were unaware that fair use had fallen off the rails in the later twentieth century in the United States. Fair use was frequently portrayed as only a response to market failure, notably in circumstances pertaining to research and education. The prevailing view was that if a work could have been licensed, it should have been licensed, and therefore unauthorized use could not be fair use. Such circularity in arguments left fair use almost inert, leading to Lawrence Lessig’s dispirited remark that fair use simply enabled one to hire a lawyer.
(The late Lyman Ray Patterson wrote extensively about this period of American history wrought as it was through Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services Inc. (1994) and American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc. (1996). I provide some details here, and my thoughts on efforts by the Second Circuit to rehabilitate fair use are here.)
Under McLachlin’s watch, Canada was spared that growing pain of fair use.
2. Dependence on Transformation
Elevating fair use out of the pit it had fallen into required years of work. A good portion of heavy lifting was carried by U.S. Judge Pierre Laval. In 1990, he proposed the element of “transformative” as a governing principle to distinguish fair use from infringement:
The use must be productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the original. … Transformative uses may include criticizing the quoted work, exposing the character of the original author, proving a fact, or summarizing an idea argued in the original in order to defend or rebut it. They also may include parody, symbolism, aesthetic declarations, and innumerable other uses.
But Canada is not dependent on invocation of “transformative.” It has not entered our vocabulary, nor should it.
Two of the three Canadian Supreme Court cases where fair dealing prevailed (in research and education) were instances where professionally published works were used for the same purposes, the same settings, for which the works were created. Academic/research works were copied for research needs, and, copies of educational content were provided to students as part of classroom learning.
Against this history, it is not only unnecessary but also ill-advised to invoke “transformative” in Canada. To academic administrators anxious to keep their institutions safe, or, in the hands of professional Canadian lobbyists, the plain-English connotation of “transformation” leads to an expectation that a new work must be created. Which then becomes an argument to discourage unauthorized uses, however fair they might be, by students and researchers.
During Friday’s discussion, the Canadian panelists reminded us that our Supreme Court stated that legitimacy of fair dealing does not require further creativity (SOCAN v. Bell (2012) para 21.) In fact, the Court expressly rebutted SOCAN’s efforts to bring the word “transformative” into discussion (paras 23-24).
PIJIP posted the video to their YouTube channel. The discussion at the end offers detailed explanation with respect to incorporating various types and portions of protected works into OERs.
Canada’s development of exceptions towards building the infrastructure of a knowledge-based economy – education and research – is robust. But it remains under-developed when it comes to actually protecting creative activity. While, as Bob notes, the recent Wiseau decision “confirms that documentary films qualify as criticism, review and news reporting under the Copyright Act’s allowable fair dealing purposes,” other forms of creativity are still without shelter under the Copyright Act. Because, as I have written earlier, sometimes art is just art.
Canada has covered a good deal of ground in attaining a flexible exception under the Copyright Act; it is gratifying that last year’s report from the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology explicitly calls for an illustrative set of purposes under fair dealing (see recommendation 18). But, we’re not there yet. As Bob also said last week, “We’re working on it.”